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Abstract
Background: Previous studies of incident reporting in health care organizations have largely focused on single
cases, and have usually attended to earlier stages of reporting. This is a comparative case study of two hospital
divisions’ use of an incident reporting system, and considers the different stages in the process and the factors that
help shape the process.
Method: The data was comprised of 85 semi-structured interviews of health care practitioners in general internal
medicine, obstetrics and neonatology; thematic analysis of the transcribed interviews was undertaken. Inductive
and deductive themes are reported. This work is part of a larger qualitative study found elsewhere in the literature.
Results: The findings showed that there were major differences between the two divisions in terms of: a) what
comprised a typical report (outcome based vs communication and near-miss based); b) how the reports were
investigated (individual manager vs interdisciplinary team); c) learning from reporting (interventions having
ambiguous linkages to the reporting system vs interventions having clear linkages to reported incidents); and
d) feedback (limited feedback vs multiple feedback).
Conclusions: The differences between the two divisions can be explained in terms of: a) the influence of litigation
on practice, b) the availability or lack of interprofessional training, and c) the introduction of the reporting system
(top-down vs bottom-up approach). A model based on the findings portraying the influences on incident reporting
and learning is provided. Implications for practice are addressed.
Keywords: Patient safety, Medical errors, Qualitative research, Internal medicine, Obstetrics, Neonatology
Background
A number of studies have found high incidences of
adverse events in health care. These include To Err is
Human [1], the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) An
Organization with a Memory [2] and the Canadian
Adverse Events Study (CAES) [3]. Incident reporting has
been recommended as one of several tools to address
this patient safety problem [4]. Incident reporting sys-
tems (IRS) have met with some success. For example,
Swartz [5] describes the success a hospital had with an
electronic IRS which allowed key players greater access
to information they needed to effect and prioritize cor-
rective actions. Osmond et al. [6] noted the diversity of
front line practitioner reported events in a successful In-
tensive Care Unit (ICU) IRS. Using a new human factors
focus within an IRS, Morag et al. [7] reported very
promising results. Overall, there have been several re-
ports of success with various IRSs.
However, IRSs have been sharply criticized as well.
Blais, Bruno, Bartlett, & Tamblyn [8] compared the chart
review process against an incident reporting technique in
adult medicine and surgery in hospitals in a province, and
found that only 15 % of incidents in the chart review were
identified in the IRS. Shojania [9] spoke of the “frustrating
case of incident reporting systems”. He highlighted phys-
ician underreporting, the lack of a denominator in IRS
metrics (incident reports reveal only how many incidents
occurred, but do not capture how many could have oc-
curred), and the deceiving metric of compliance with hav-
ing an IRS irrespective of how the system functions (the
system could be solely a data collection system without
any follow up). In a later paper, Shojania further stated
that relying on IRSs exclusively is not a good way to assess
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patient safety, but instead a number of different methods
should be used [10]. In his report “Hospital Incident
Reporting Systems Do Not Capture Most Patient Harm”,
the Inspector General of the American Department of
Health and Human Resources noted that administrators
rely heavily on IRSs to identify problems, in spite of the
well-known underreporting problems [11].
Despite extensive studies on IRSs, few researchers
have identified or investigated the different stages of
incident reporting. Most studies tend to focus on the
reporting phase, whether and how it occurs [6, 12–15].
Less attention has been given to what happens after a
report is entered. Yet, studying what happens post-
report submission is essential because it allows us to
discover if IRSs contribute to or fall short of enhancing
patient safety and to understand how this occurs. Fur-
ther, few studies have attempted to compare IRSs in
different organizations or departments. Studying more
than one case allows researchers to see dynamics
across cases, “to understand how they are qualified by
local conditions, and thus to develop more sophisti-
cated descriptions and more powerful explanations”
([16], p. 172).
The purpose of this study is to understand the different
stages of electronic incident reporting and to do so in a
comparative study of two hospital divisions: General
Internal Medicine (GIM), Obstetrics and Neonatology
(OBS/NEO – for the purposes of this study, Obstetrics
and Neonatology will be treated as a single division except
where noted). These two divisions were chosen because
they used the same electronic IRS differently. In addition,
OBS/NEO was one of the earliest divisions to engage in
electronic incident reporting, while GIM adopted the
system later. Our preliminary discussions with div-
isional representatives had previously indicated that
the dynamics associated with the IRS were different
in the two divisions, and we thus pursued an in-
depth study of these two cases.
Conceptual background
IRSs are complex socio-technical systems. Øvretveit
provided the introduction to a special issue of Social
Science & Medicine, stating that
The social sciences are increasingly viewed by policy-
makers and implementers as a resource for helping
with the considerable challenges they have encountered
in ‘implementing’ changes which are thought to be
necessary to improve safety and quality…the value of
social science perspectives [include] questioning
common assumptions and showing why some strategies–
such as voluntary incident reporting – are not meeting
their aims ([17], p. 1780,1782).
Hor et al. found that there is a multiplicity of account-
ability roles affiliated with incident reporting, stating that
“the incident reporting system and its policy are inter-
woven with other accountabilities in the local context”
and that “local accountabilities can also be in conflict
with the aims of the incident reporting system and the
incident management policy” ([18], p. 1097).
Incident reporting is fundamentally a multi-stage process
[19, 20], as shown in Fig. 1.
Generally, information enters the IRS at the detection
stage, the reports are investigated and analyzed at the
analysis stage, which feeds into the learning stage, from
which incident reporting leads to some change in under-
standing or practice. Feedback can occur at the analysis
and/or learning stages.
Detection stage
The majority of the studies of IRSs to date have focussed
on the first stage; reporting. A few studies have de-
scribed the reporting phase: Tighe, Woloshynowych,
Brown, Wears, & Vincent [21] reported that a nurse or
physician filled out a paper form with the aid of an inci-
dent book, classifying the type of incident in broad, pre-
defined categories with as much detail as possible, up to
including contact detail of witnesses; Cunningham &
Geller [22], noted that the reporter was given reporting
criteria and a form with check boxes and free text in
which to enter an event description. However, the ma-
jority of studies focussing on the reporting of events into
IRSs highlight the factors enabling or inhibiting report-
ing. Barriers that have been identified to prevent detec-
tion and reporting of incidents are numerous, and
Fig. 1 A high level depiction of an incident reporting system
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include fear of exposing incompetence or reprisal (both
public and medical), lack of time, lack of education on
what is a reportable incident, lack of feedback and fu-
tility [23–25]. Studies identifying enablers of detection
and reporting are less numerous, and include incident
severity, evidence that the profession values reporting,
greater availability of reporting pathways, timely feed-
back and visible changes linked to reports in the IRS
[13, 24, 25].
However, not all studies of the first stage of reporting
identify enablers and inhibitors to reporting incidents.
For example, Waring [26] proposed that the emphasis
on assigning blame in incident reporting neglects the
culture of medicine, such as physicians’ belief in the in-
evitability of error and viewing reporting as a bureau-
cratic exercise. Hewitt et al. [13] looked at the frames
underlying nurses’ and physicians’ decision to report,
and found that attention is rarely given to systemic, lar-
ger organizational safety issues. An underlying message
of a variety of studies [15, 27, 28], is the need to increase
the number of reports entered into the reporting system,
and as such, these studies remain focussed on the first
stage of reporting.
Analysis stage
Fewer studies have looked at other aspects of reporting
such as the analysis stage. Pham, Girard, & Pronovost [29]
recommended investigating reports thoroughly and involv-
ing multiple stakeholder input to enhance the value of IRSs.
The large quantity of reports entered into IRSs has been
noted as a possible barrier which can limit the ability to do
meaningful data analysis [30, 31]. Bush [32], in a descriptive
study, traced how a reported incident was investigated, de-
scribing how a multi-disciplinary team interviewed those
involved in each incident, and subsequently met to discuss
and agree on findings. Tighe et al. [21] described a clinical
risk management team which collected completed report-
ing forms, assigned severity and likelihood of recurrence
scores, and then entered the information into a central
reporting system. Cunningham & Geller [22] described a
review process whereby individual managers wrote their
follow up action on the same reporting form filled out by
the reporter, but in a different text box. In Waring &
Currie’s [19] study of a UK hospital, reports from the
hospital were analyzed by a central risk management de-
partment, sometimes with a brief assessment which priori-
tized managerial accounting over the contextual narrative
describing the incident, overriding the reporter’s effort to
provide all relevant details to understand the event. As
these studies show, there are a number of different
ways in which reported incidents can be analyzed, but
only a few studies of IRSs describe these processes,
and even fewer studies undertake a comparative study
of incident analysis.
Learning stage
Some studies have addressed learning in hospital set-
tings. Bush [32] described how an interdisciplinary team
that investigated incidents then presented their findings
to a Quality Assurance Committee with senior leader-
ship, whereby the recommendations were oriented to
system fixes (changes in design) as opposed to individual
fixes (training). Tighe et al. [21] described how, once the
clinical risk management team entered reports into the
system, the same team reviewed the reports monthly,
and followed up investigations and/or actions. In
Cunningham & Geller’s [22] study, managers who filled
out their section of the reporting form collected the re-
ports and sent them to a central risk management de-
partment for review and database entry. Generally,
however, IRSs are seldom cited as the genesis of learning
interventions. Mahajan [33], focusing on the IRS, stated
that the current paradigm of quick judgements and
assigning of blame does not promote learning, whereas
analysis with a human factors lens and then feedback to
the reporter are key practices promoting learning from
IRSs. The few studies that describe the learning phase in
IRSs range from storing reports to interprofessional
meetings with an accountable process to follow up cor-
rective actions, yet comparisons between different IRS
learning processes are not present in the IRS literature.
Feedback
In the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) guideline on
how to establish reporting systems, feedback is emphasized
as a key feature. “Even with simple systems that focus pri-
marily on recognizing hazards, resources should be avail-
able to support follow-up on reports, provide feedback to
the reporter, and conduct at least a limited investigation
when indicated” ([4], p. 55). In a study of the UK NHS, fif-
teen different aspects of feedback were highlighted as rec-
ommendations for IRSs [34]. Overall, if data is collected,
including that from IRSs, it serves little purpose if its effects
are not fed back to the reporter [35]. Feedback is an im-
portant yet often overlooked area of IRSs.
IRS in GIM and OBS/NEO
Incident reporting has also been studied in specific hos-
pital departments. As this present study investigates in-
cident reporting in the division of General Internal
Medicine (GIM – a subset of the Department of Medicine)
and the divisions of Obstetrics and Neonatology (OBS/
NEO - a subset of the Department of Obstetrics/
Gynecology & Newborn Care), a brief review of the litera-
ture concerning incident reporting and patient safety in
these two divisions is warranted. General internal medicine
is a core hospital division, and takes care of a wide variety
of patients and patient conditions, although the vast major-
ity of the inpatients are elderly. A number of studies of IRS
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use in GIM have been conducted. One study, aiming to
improve reporting rates by reminding residents to report,
found that the programme only succeeded in the short
term [36]. Another study used Root Cause Analysis (RCA)
in the analysis of reports, and revealed that human error
is often linked to technical and organizational causes [37].
Obstetrics and Neonatology’s patients are pregnant
mothers and at risk and premature babies respectively. A
study found that the overall perception of safety and
management support predicted reporting behaviour in a
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) [38], while positive
team dynamics in labour and delivery were found to de-
crease the need for incident reports [39]. Another study
recommended a structure for a critical IRS in Obstetrics
and Neonatology, suggesting specific incident categories
and a detailed review process [40].
However, despite the richness of the literature on indi-
vidual departments and their struggles at the reporting
stage, few researchers have analyzed departments in par-
allel in a comparative study.
This qualitative comparative case study of GIM and
OBS/NEO hospital divisions attempts to fill some of these
gaps by answering the following research questions:
Research Question 1: What are the similarities and
differences in incident detection, the analysis process,
and learnings in two hospital divisions, GIM and
OBS/NEO?
Research Question 2: What factors account for these
differences?
This study extends work that has been done on IRSs
by going beyond the reporting stage and by undertaking
a comparison of the IRS processes in two departments.
Methods
Qualitative studies are useful for inquiries that ask what,
how and why questions, “which help us to understand
social phenomena in natural (rather than experimental)
settings, giving due emphasis to the meanings, experi-
ences, and views of all the participants” ([41], p. 42). As
the present study seeks to understand the workings of
an IRS in different settings, it is suited to a qualitative
research approach. The study adopts a comparative case
study design. Comparative case studies help researchers
avoid jumping to conclusions with limited data, avoid ig-
noring disconfirming evidence, and prevent them from
being overly influenced by higher profile study subjects
([42], p. 540). A comparative case study design is more
robust than studying a single case, as replication can be
realized – either literally (when similar results are ob-
tained between cases) or theoretically (when contrasting
results between cases emerge) [43].
The study focused on voluntary incident reporting and
patient safety in a multi-campus teaching hospital in
Ontario, Canada. The IRS at the hospital was available
to employees through any networked device. The gen-
eral process involved the following: The reporter entered
information using the patient’s medical record number,
identified the event, and provided a narrative describing
the patient safety incident using facts. Incident investiga-
tors at the hospital were informed of an incident report
by email and could forward reports to other depart-
ments for further investigation. Once reports were inves-
tigated and considered closed (and removed from email),
they were forwarded to Core review for larger hospital
issue investigation and archiving.
Data collection began in spring 2012 in GIM and
ended in fall 2014 with OBS/NEO. Our data collection
in each department started with our attending a quality
review meeting where the researchers were introduced
to key personnel who would later become interviewees.
These key individuals helped us access other inter-
viewees by contacting managers and practitioners. Over
five months, two researchers (both independently and
together) confidentially interviewed GIM participants; a
similar process was adopted for OBS/NEO. Overall
eighty-five participants were interviewed as shown in
Table 1.
The interview included questions about the IRS: how
it was introduced, structured and used. There were also
questions about safety practices and safety culture. Inter-
views averaged approximately 45 min, and were digitally
recorded and subsequently transcribed. Data analysis
was undertaken by two researchers who met to discuss
the themes in the interviews and the derivation of codes.
Atlas ti software (GmbH, Berlin, Germany) was used to
code the interviews and retrieve quotations. The analysis
involved both a deductive and inductive approach [16].
Through a reading of the literature, we were informed
about concepts and approaches related to IRS and pa-
tient safety (deductive approach); some sample codes
based on the literature included Fear of Reporting, Feed-
back, Individual Staff Focus and Systems Thinking. Our
Table 1 Generic interviewee titles
Job Category GIM Job Category OBS/NEO
Physicians 11 Physicians 8
Nurse Leadersa 5 Nurse Leaders 15
Bedside Nurses 15 Bedside Nurses 15
Pharmacy 3 Midwives 3
Physiotherapists 3 Respiratory Therapy 4
Nursing Support 3
Total 40 Total 45
aNurse Leaders is a tem referring to all nurses with a job function not
exclusively at the bedside
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analysis of the data revealed local practices related to the
use of the IRS (inductive approach); some sample codes
derived inductively included Pre Screen, Quality Assur-
ance (QA) committee, Litigation and History. Through
an iterative process of moving between the literature
and the data, we identified differences in reporting, ana-
lysis and learning in GIM and OBS/NEO, as well as the
reasons why these differences exist. We conducted the
analysis for each department separately and then en-
gaged in comparison. In other words, we followed Miles
and Huberman’s [16] recommendation to do a within
case analysis followed by a cross-case analysis.
This study underwent ethics review at both the hospital
where the study was conducted, and the researchers’ uni-
versity. Trustworthiness [44] was established by ensuring
the researchers were in constant communication, ques-
tioning potential biases and assumptions, and returning to
the data when there were disagreements. Member check-
ing [44] was undertaken through presentations to inter-
professional (quality) meetings of the different divisions
and seeking feedback on the results reported.
Results
In this section, the divisions’ experience with incident
reporting is analyzed: first, GIM, then OBS/NEO. In
each division, the reporting process is examined through
reporting events, analyzing events, learning from re-
ported events and system feedback.
Detection, analysis, learning and feedback in GIM
Incident detection – GIM – predominantly nurses, outcome
based
Incident detection in GIM was examined in its connec-
tion to the history of incident reporting in that division.
Historically, incident reporting was on paper, done ex-
clusively by nurses, and was seen as punitive. The fact
that it was a paper based system tended to restrict its
use to nurses: “the whole sort of paper incident report
used to be largely just nursing generated” (GIM Phys-
ician 6). Although physicians and other practitioners
could and did report into the present IRS, they did so
much less than did the nurses.
I think we’re just so used to thinking of ourselves as a
unit in terms of nursing practices and nursing
processes and we’re so used to dealing with issues
within our own scope of practice that I don’t think
many people think of [reporting] as being a tool for
physician improvement as well. (GIM Nurse Leader 4)
Furthermore, there was a perceived punitive compo-
nent to this reporting. The perception of the old system
being blame-based lingered in the minds of some of the
nurses with longer tenures.
For anybody that’s been here as long as I have, you
had 3 medication errors and you were being
disciplined…I don’t know if that was even indeed the
case but that was what I grew up being a nurse at the
bedside being petrified of ‘oh my goodness if I made
this error’ (GIM Nurse Leader 3)
However, at the time of the interview, interviewees stated
their knowledge that the IRS was non-punitive, and that
the intent was to learn from reported events. A nurse de-
scribed, “Med errors are not obviously in favour of my
career …but incident reports … should be looked at so
[incidents] can be stopped in whatever way possible” (GIM
Bedside Nurse 11). Many nurses espoused similar opinions
that the present IRS was non-punitive. Physicians were
more skeptical about the IRS being non-punitive.
I think there’s still quite a culture that people are
afraid to report things because of either sort of
punishment in the future whether it be medico-legal
punishment, punishment from a colleague or a
superior or causing a relationship to deteriorate
between 2 staff physicians because someone told on
me basically. (GIM Physician 7)
With nurses more or less believing that the system
was non-punitive, what did they report? Overall, falls
and medication errors comprised the vast majority of re-
ported incidents in GIM: “The things that come to us
most frequently are things that are nursing related; med-
ications, transcriptions, falls” (GIM Nurse Leader 5).
These incidents were realized – a patient had fallen, a
medication error had occurred. The orientation of most
of the reports was outcome based, that is, the outcome
determined whether or not a report should be written.
This had consequences for near miss reporting, as by
definition near misses do not have a negative outcome.
Hence, near misses were rarely reported, despite the cor-
porate messaging that they should have been.
Near misses…I think people are thinking it’s not an
incident, it’s a near miss, even though we should still
report them. It is still time consuming so I think near
misses don’t get reported as much as they should, if at
all. (GIM Bedside Nurse 3)
In summary, in GIM, typical incidents were outcome
based (chiefly falls and medication errors), and reported
principally by nurses. Despite the blame-based past, nurses
stated that reporting was now generally non-punitive.
Analysis process – GIM –siloed approach
The unit level review was undertaken by a nurse leader
who, upon reading the incident in email, decided on the
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level of follow up. The follow up that the nurse leader
engaged in directly was often focussed on an individual
that was involved with the reported incident. An ex-
ample on narcotic disposal is described below, along
with the intervention that the nurse leader did with re-
spect to this incident.
There is a proper way of wasting a narcotic and [the
nurse] didn’t use that. So that would be my
recommendation and then details of follow up would
be: [The nurse] needs to review the narcotic [policy].
(GIM Nurse Leader 3)
In some situations, the individual described in the re-
port (with whom the follow up would be conducted)
was unknown. “With this [IRS] I don’t have the assign-
ment readily available; I don’t have the chart readily
available so I can’t make the investigation to see who the
nurse was. So my solution is to present it at a staff meet-
ing, but again it doesn’t make it as meaningful” (GIM
Nurse Leader 3). In contrast to an individually focussed
approach, the nurse leader might have viewed the inci-
dent with a systems lens, seeing the incident in a larger
context. A nurse leader reflected on systems approaches,
instead of focusing exclusively on an individual: “Because
if you made a mistake, most likely it’s human error or
there’s some system in place that was just not working”
(GIM Nurse Leader 2). However, a systems view was not
as frequently engaged with as the individual view.
Once the investigation was over, the nurse leader
closed the incident report. The incident reports were
also separately reviewed by a physician (clinical reviewer)
to determine if harm had occurred to the patient, and if
it was avoidable. The sequence of the nurse leader re-
view and the physician review was not clear – they may
have been in an order, or simultaneous. “You write out
what it was and then there’s a check…‘was that related
to the medical treatment or was that related to the
medical condition?’ and ‘was it preventable?’” (GIM
Physician 2). The level of information given, as the major-
ity of reports were written by nurses, was often insufficient
for the physician reviewers to undertake a full review.
Well the nurse for example doesn’t go into the detail
that you would like to have into the case…. [A review]
took me almost an hour in just trying to figure out
what that person was trying to say what happened…
When a physician reports, especially if we’re dealing
with a more medical issue, it’s a little bit better to be
done by somebody who has a little bit more
knowledge into the medical issues. (GIM Physician 3)
Some users stated that the system had yet to advance
beyond data collection, implying that the potential of the
IRS had not been realized. “We need to be sitting down
probably with the nurse leaders or somebody from the
Division, looking at how you prevent medical errors…
The way I perceive it [the IRS] is just data collecting at
the moment” (GIM Physician 2).
All in all, in General Internal Medicine the various
reviews took place independently – nurse leaders and
physician reviewers often did their reviews in their
offices, reviewing the same (typically nurse) reported
events. There was some follow up at the individual
level for nurses but there was no joint (physician and
nurse) overview of reported incidents.
Learning through reporting – GIM – ambiguous linkage to
reports
Nurse leaders stated their view that the learning that in-
dividual nurses received were “teachable moments”,
where the approach was non-threatening, and the indi-
vidual felt safe to discuss incidents with the leader.
I always try to use it as something like a teachable
moment … You don’t want people to be afraid to tell
you they’ve made a mistake and so I think we’ve done
a very good job. But people still are very nervous…
All we want to do is learn from this …as long as you
walk out with a way to improve your practice that’s
what I believe it’s all about, to make it safer for the
patients. (GIM Nurse Leader 2)
A systems view could also result in learning from re-
ported incidents,
For me it’s very helpful because now I can see
trends… [People] individually have their own
problem, but this now allows us to see it as a systems
issue. So we notice that this mistake is happening
with this medication or this process so we can go
back and discuss it. We are able to pinpoint a systems
issue rather than reflect on one individual issue,
which for me is very helpful because it’s education, it’s
global, it’s not a problem with a nurse, it’s usually
related to a system. (GIM Nurse Leader 4)
This approach was not as common as individual “teach-
able moments”. When asked what learning emerged from
the IRS, a physician reviewer noted flagging cases suitable
for Mortality and Morbidity (M&M) rounds.
From our point as the Clinical Reviewers we review
them all and then we will note which ones we think
might be important to review within the Division as
far as for Mortality & Morbidity rounds. So things of
more clinical interest instead of structural or
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administrative changes that need to be looked at.
(GIM Physician 2)
M&M rounds were meetings that traditionally physi-
cians attended, to analyze a case in detail to determine if
there was, as a physician stated, a “cognitive” (a decision
error on the part of the physician in the case) or a
“system error”. However, since physicians did not report
frequently, many of the M&M cases had to be obtained
through personal communication: “We haven’t been
using the [IRS] as our database to gather the cases”
(GIM Physician 4). Given that these rounds were for
physician learning from cases, they didn’t have an interdis-
ciplinary audience. Overall, nurses’ learning was mostly
through individual “teachable moments”, and less effort
was exerted on systemic issues that might have been iden-
tified through the IRS. M&M rounds were to allow physi-
cians to discuss catastrophic cases, which may or may not
have been informed by a report in the IRS.
Feedback – GIM – weak
Some of the participants did not know what happened to
reports they wrote. “We hit a send button and I never hear
about it again. It does nothing for me.” (GIM Bedside Nurse
1). Others had a vague idea of the review that happened,
“My manager will sometimes follow up with me. But who-
ever else it goes to, these people who review it, perhaps it
goes to researchers, I don’t know” (GIM Bedside Nurse 8).
While staff meetings may have given back some informa-
tion to reporters, not informing the reporter on the change
that their report prompted got the reporters to believe their
time was not valued: “I’m taking 10 min of my time [to re-
port] I’d like to know that it’s at least helping… They would
probably encourage us to do more if we see ‘oh it’s making
a difference’” (GIM Bedside Nurse 6).
It was also possible for reporters to become cynical of
the IRS due to lack of feedback, which could have a de-
moralizing effect and serve as reason to not use the IRS.
Honestly it was an event that very significantly
affected me emotionally but I didn’t hear anything
back from it. I didn’t get any feedback as to how this
was rectified and how we’re gonna change the system
or anything really. And so I think that was really
frustrating and that’s probably why I haven’t been
motivated to use it again. (GIM Physician 10)
Overall, feedback based on the IRS was identified as a
major weakness in GIM.
Summary – incident reporting, analysis, learning through
reporting and feedback – GIM
Incident reporting was done primarily by nurses. The
types of incidents recorded were primarily outcome
based, and included mainly falls and medication errors.
The analysis was undertaken by individual nurse leaders
who more often than not had a focus on the individual.
The individual physician reviewers assessed if harm was
preventable, sometimes with difficulty. Learning through
reporting mentioned by interviewees was individual
“teachable moments” for nurses delivered by nurse
leaders, and physician reviewers identifying cases for
M&M rounds, although most M&M round cases were
not informed by the IRS. Divisional knowledge of the in-
cident analysis process was limited, and feedback to the
reporters (aside from staff meetings) was rare.
Detection, analysis, learning and feedback in OBS/NEO
Incident detection – OBS/NEO –team approach, near miss
reporting
In this section, we grouped Obstetrics (OBS) and
Neonatology (NEO), but there were some differences be-
tween the two departments in practices, which we indicate
where pertinent. In the past, OBS had an IRS unique to
them, prior to the current version of the organization-
wide reporting system. It was developed in house, and was
not accessible beyond this division. However, many re-
ported that the specific OBS IRS facilitated the transition
to the present IRS in OBS. Below, nurse leaders described
the history with the OBS specific IRS, and how it provided
a background for the present day reporting practices.
[The OBS IRS] was exactly what the [current reporting]
system is all about. And we were doing it years before
the [current IRS] was invented. So I think most of the
people in the Birthing Unit are quite comfortable on
reporting the cases because we’re reporting the same
things. (OBS/NEO Nurse Leader 12)
It was the very same philosophy [as the current IRS];
near misses, misses, policies that weren’t being
followed. (OBS/NEO Nurse Leader 7)
OBS customized the present IRS by creating a drop
down menu of specific indicators – beyond only the free
text box that guided practitioners on what to report –
inspired by experience with their OBS specific system.
Near misses were expected in the IRS. Near misses
could be general (e.g. about to give the incorrect medi-
cation) or specific drop downs (e.g. a newborn having
pH of gases <7 or >12.5), and were consistently reported,
as can be seen from the quotes below.
I think the incident reporting system is probably good
for [being proactive] because if it’s a near miss then that
can indicate an issue that needs attention before it’s an
outcome that’s not a near miss, a definite incident
where someone was hurt. (OBS/NEO Bedside Nurse 2)
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[We report bad outcomes and near misses] because they’re
both learning experiences (OBS/NEO Bedside Nurse 4)
Drop down menus helped facilitate near miss report-
ing, and there was a clear expectation and a willingness
to report:
They’re gonna be reluctant to put things in say[ing]
“Why are you [reporting] that?” “Oh because the PH
was 6.9 and anything <7 we have to put it in” and the
person says “Okay even when the baby’s fine?” “Well
even though the baby’s fine it just has to go in” so I
think that kind of defrays some of the why are you
putting that in. (OBS/NEO Physician 3)
I just fit it in my day. It’s like everything else I do it’s
just part of the duties it’s just an accepted part. It’s not
an exception, it’s not a burden, it’s just part of the
duties. (OBS/NEO Respiratory Therapist 2)
Near miss reporting was a well-established practice in
Obstetrics, with interviewees having stated near miss
reporting was part of their reporting culture.
There appeared to be no blame in incident reporting
in Obstetrics. Further, emphasis on an interdisciplinary
team approach ensuring completeness of the incident re-
port was the focus.
On this unit we have a very close rapport with the
doctor …we have to be a tight unit because when the
emergencies are happening we need help and we
usually work as a tight unit. So if something goes
wrong we talk about it and we make sure that all the
information is filled in for it to not happen again and
I don’t feel like people are trying to blame each other
when we fill these, it’s just to improve how things are
supposed to run. (OBS/NEO Bedside Nurse 5)
We have moved away from the culture of blame to
more of a team-based culture. (OBS/NEO Physician 3)
Overall, Obstetrics had a history of incident reporting,
and reporting near misses was a well-established prac-
tice. Practitioners generally indicated that blame was not
a concern, and that an interprofessional team approach
was important.
Analysis process – OBS/NEO – multidisciplinary team approach
Historically, the OBS IRS “generated a very similar re-
view process to what the current [IRS] process has”
(OBS/NEO Nurse Leader 4). As such, there was more
experience and familiarity with the review process in
Obstetrics. Incident review followed a sequence starting
with a designated nurse leader or a delegate.
You have to go through all the documentation …
Sometimes you do need to interview the physicians
and/or nurses to find out because the documentation
isn’t clear … … I try not [to delegate] cases that are
too complex …. (OBS/NEO Nurse Leader 10)
This review involved an investigation, and may have
had an individual focus and the report closed at that
point. However, most cases were reviewed both at the
nursing level and at pre-screen.
The pre-screen phase had a multi-disciplinary team
looking at the completed reviews monthly: “[An obstetri-
cian], the manager of the clinics as well as the critical
care leader from Labour & Delivery and then often one
of the care facilitators, so the 4 of them go through each
case” (OBS/NEO Nurse Leader 5). The pre-screen com-
mittee did an analysis of its own.
Was there harm? Was there potential for harm? Was
there no harm? Was there no potential for harm?
From a 4 to a 10 you have to rate where you feel
there was definitely harm. Was it because of medical
care? Was it likely not because of medical care?… So
in order to close an [incident report] and send it to
the archives you had to answer those questions (OBS/
NEO Nurse Leader 5)
The pre-screen committee decided on what to archive,
what to follow up with further at the unit level, and what
to bring to the Quality Assurance (QA) committee. The
QA committee, which met monthly, was a multidiscip-
linary departmental committee with representation from
all the divisions (including neonatology), and all the pro-
fessions involved in OBS and newborn care. The types
of cases that were brought forward to QA were those
that had some system learning potential.
What goes to the QA table mostly is systemic
problems. So if, for example, there’s a communication
breakdown between Anaesthesia or Neonates or
whatever that goes to the QA table every single time
because that can be prevented. (OBS/NEO Nurse
Leader 2)
The analysis in QA involved a discussion inviting all at
the table to contribute their professional opinions.
Everybody is pretty forthcoming and they hash it out
at the table and you get a different perspective put on
it and yes that makes sense, right. It takes some of the
reaction out of it, when you get the different
approaches, it’s not all about me, you can see the
other sides to different things (OBS/NEO Nurse
Leader 11)
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The QA committee was seen positively by most who
were involved in the QA process.
Out of all the different obstetrical units I’ve
participated in I think that the way they’ve developed
the QA meetings and persistence with the QA
meetings and the way it’s recorded, reported and
followed up is probably the most impressive… They
have gone a long way to try and promote patient care
and safety that way. (OBS/NEO Physician 4)
Overall, with the emphasis on multidisciplinary team
meetings to review incidents at multiple levels, incident
analysis in OBS/NEO was an inclusive process that
allowed each discipline’s voice to be heard.
Learning through reporting – OBS/NEO- strong linkage to reports
Often changes took place because of reported incidents;
for example, a nurse talked about a call bell system prob-
lem that got resolved soon after he/she and others re-
ported it, “So that was very positive. We felt like oh these
people are listening to us. We’re not just filling these for
nothing so that’s good” (OBS/NEO Bedside Nurse 5).
Other experiences of linking changes to incident reports
were mentioned such as a rewrite of an HIV medication
order sheet and a repair of an anesthesia call button in the
OR. However, one intervention that was prompted by in-
cident reports was spontaneously spoken of by multiple
interviewees in Neonatology.
(OBS/NEO Nurse Leader 4): …like unplanned
extubations where they’re supposed to complete an
[incident report], we just said as a way of tracking,
because sometimes it’s only when you look at something
that you see there’s a pattern. Because it might happen to
her, it might happen to her, but it doesn’t happen to the
same person and so people don’t think about it.
(Interviewer): And that was found through [the IRS]?
(OBS/NEO Nurse Leader 4): Yeah, yeah.
(Interviewer): Do you know of any changes that have
come about because of the [IRS]?
(OBS/NEO Bedside Nurse 13) Definitely like the
accidental extubations is primarily one that we are
learning from absolutely because it’s only through that
that we’re learning how many are happening and…from
that we can identify that more babies are being self-
extubated than we would really like to see basically.
A quality improvement initiative for unplanned extu-
bations was spearheaded by a respiratory therapist, who
was asked to begin noting how many accidental extuba-
tions were actually happening.
So I put a memo and I say, okay we need to really
track this guys, we think it’s a problem. We need to
have it reported. So we kind of made them alert …
and defined what’s an accidental extubation… (OBS/
NEO Respiratory Therapist 1)
These accidental extubations were not frequent to an
individual practitioner – only when looked at collectively
would anyone know there was a problem, which could
be done through the IRS. Instead of only reminding in-
dividual practitioners to be more careful, the approach
was to see these accidental extubations as a systemic
problem. When the respiratory therapist learned that
other neonatology departments were having similar
problems, it lent credence to the idea that it might be a
problem at this hospital too.
I went to a conference and [another hospital]
presented accidental extubation so it was an issue for
them too…We had a long phone interview with a
physician at University of Pennsylvania [They were
working on the same problem] (OBS/NEO Respiratory
Therapist 1)
The work was a quality assurance project, with sup-
port from the corporate quality department (unrelated
to the QA committee in OBS/NEO) and training ses-
sions and roll out were done with their help. At the time
of the interview, the project seemed to be a success.
We’re now at 135 days today and when we tracked
and looked…We went 133 days between the last
extubation to the next accidental extubation, the
longest stretch we ever did…so now we’ve passed
it…(OBS/NEO Respiratory Therapist 1)
Feedback - OBS/NEO – moderate
Notwithstanding the feedback of having a reported prob-
lem fixed (the best feedback possible), informing the re-
porter was still challenging. Staff meetings were a way of
disseminating information, and other feedback also oc-
curred occasionally, especially if the reporter was invited
to share his/her viewpoint at a QA meeting. Addition-
ally, there was a bi-annual newsletter that went to the
department (including OBS/NEO) called “Closing the
Loop”, but due to its general dissemination, individual
reporters mentioned appreciating receiving feedback: “I
know there’s that Closing the Loop Newsletter that goes
around but it’s very general… As far as us reporting our
own thing I don’t think it’s very specific about that…
“(OBS/NEO Bedside Nurse 2)
Those in positions who could initiate more feedback
to reporters realized this weakness of the system, and
had plans to improve this aspect of incident reporting.
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“Something I think we could do better at is closing the
loop with staff. So [we need to] figure out how to do that
and that’s something that I’d like to work on over the
next year to do that a little bit better.” (OBS/NEO Nurse
Leader 9). A physician stated, “if they took the time to
put the information in [the IRS], somebody [should
then] take the time to give the information back” (OBS/
NEO Physician 4). Most participants believed that there
was room for improving feedback to reporters.
Summary - incident reporting, analysis, learning from
reporting and feedback-OBS/NEO
OBS had some experience with a previous IRS, whereby
non-punitive reporting including near misses was an
ingrained practice. A team approach was common. Ana-
lysis with an individual focus was done by nurse leaders,
who recommended reports with a system focus (most
reports, according to the nurse leaders who first
reviewed the reports) to the multidisciplinary pre-screen
committee that reviewed incidents. Reports with sys-
temic learning potential were often brought forth to the
multi-disciplinary departmental QA committee, where
they were reviewed and typically policy changes were
made. Changes could be traced to the IRS. The depart-
ment had a newsletter that highlighted the IRS, but indi-
vidual feedback to reporters was a priority for those who
could effect local change.
A summary of the differences in incident detection,
analysis, learning and feedback between GIM and OBS/
NEO is shown in Table 2.
Factors that influence the IRS practices in GIM and OBS/
NEO
The main influences on IRS use were seemingly the
threat of litigation, the introduction of the IRS and inter-
professional training. In what follows, we compare how
each of these influences affected incident reporting prac-
tices in the two departments.
Influence of litigation
In GIM, physicians spoke more than nurses about the
legal influence on their overall practice, and their report-
ing practices in particular, indicating that the threat of a
lawsuit was one of the barriers to physician reporting.
That might end up in the courts if you get [a] litigious
family … you can always get a lawyer who will make
something of it. So [doctors] tend to then failsafe…
there is a certain amount of defensive medicine
…(GIM Physician 5)
[Doctors] aren’t really sure what’s gonna happen to
[reported] information and I don’t know if they’re
worried if it’s a medical/legal issue…(GIM Physician 4)
The threat of litigation influenced physicians’ practices
in GIM as there was concern that reported information
could lead to legal proceedings. However, the threat of
litigation was stronger in OBS/NEO.
In the adult world [the window of litigation] is
3 years. So I could have something go wrong in that
world and outlive the issue. But in the neonatal world
…our window of litigation is age of majority plus
2 years… it can come back to haunt you in 5 years,
7 years, 10 years and if you have no record of it, now
what? (OBS/NEO Respiratory Therapist 2)
The statute of limitations, or how long a complainant
has to launch a lawsuit, was far longer in OBS/NEO
than in GIM. This was one of the factors that influenced
reporting practices. If there was no record of an event,
and a lawsuit was launched, the practitioner would be in
a difficult position. Furthermore, the amount of money
in the OBS/NEO lawsuits was substantial.
Our specialty is the most litigious specialty …Of the
Canadian Medical Protective Association [payouts],
Table 2 Comparison of the incident reporting process in GIM and OBS/NEO
Reporting Aspect GIM OBS/NEO
Incident detection Predominantly nurses Team approach
Predominantly outcome based (falls and medication errors) Outcome and near miss based
Analysis Individual nurse leader investigation Individual nurse leader investigation
Individual physician review to determine preventable harm Multidisciplinary pre-screen committee review
Larger multidisciplinary QA review for policy type issues
Learning through reporting Feedback to individual nurses through “teachable
moments”
System focus
Ambiguous linkage to incident reports (e.g. M&M rounds) Clear linkage to incident reports (e.g. Accidental extubation
project in NICU)
Feedback Staff meetings (nursing) Staff meetings, bi-annual newsletter, occasional reporter
participation in QA meeting
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close to about 28 % [are from] OBS/Newborn Care
mostly OBS … When the cases do go bad, the
outcome is a lifetime of disability. That’s why our staff
here has embraced this system-related issue for the
risk management far earlier, far more aggressively
than some others (OBS/NEO Physician 5)
In contrast to GIM where incident reports could be
seen as a trigger to lawsuits, physicians in OBS/NEO
expressed a different view.
The lawyers aren’t gonna go after you just because
you’ve had an incident report. The lawyers are gonna
go after you because the patients have started the
process because something bad has happened. So
better that we do the incident reporting so bad things
don’t happen, I think is the kind of way that we look
at it. (OBS/NEO Physician 7)
The threat of litigation is seemingly proportional to the
use of the reporting system – the lower the threat, the less
the reporting system is used (GIM), and the higher the
threat and the longer the period of potential threat, the
more the reporting system is used (OBS/NEO).
Introduction of the IRS
The way the IRS was introduced to leaders and to the front
line staff in the two divisions was revealing. In GIM, a
Nurse Leader was invited to help customize the system for
use in the unit, but the initiative came from the IRS team.
How was it introduced? I absolutely remember. I got
invited to a meeting that was 4 hours long and I had
no clue what it was about, is how I was introduced to
the whole thing. But then teaching came out after that
where we were part of the pilot actually helping to
formulate the actual form that’s online now. So they
would ask us what we thought. What information
needed to be in there? What would make it easier for
the staff filling it out? (GIM Nurse Leader 2)
The corporate project team invited contributions from
those whose divisions were going to be affected on how
the project would look in their area. As such, while there
may have been some customization of the IRS for GIM,
it was at the invitation of the corporate project, although
it is clear from the quotation that this contributor was
not initially in the know regarding his/her role. The re-
quirements for the customization of the IRS for GIM
were discovered and incorporated after the division was
invited to trial the IRS in a pilot project.
Another aspect of how the IRS was introduced in-
volved training the front line staff. In GIM, this training
focussed on the logistics of reporting – how to access
the reporting form, what boxes to fill out and where to
click to submit. This training was provided as part of the
roll out, and was given by the corporate team.
I believe I just got a little in-service at the hospital…
very quickly showing us the screens and what infor-
mation needs to be inputted and that’s basically I
think all that I remember really getting out of it.
(GIM Bedside Nurse 2)
There might have been myself [and] just 3 or 4 people
sitting around a little corner of a computer and she
just showed us how to enter in an adverse event.
(GIM Bedside Nurse 12)
(Interviewer)In your training that you had received
when it was rolled out, was what should and should
not be reported covered?
(GIM Bedside Nurse 13)I don’t recall that they had
gone into saying what should and shouldn’t be
reported.
Those on the unit who train the incoming nurses con-
tinue to train on the logistics of reporting
(GIM Nurse Leader 5)They actually [get] training in
corporate. They also have to do an online module
before they can have access to [the IRS] I do fill in the
holes of showing them what screens to go to, how to
work through the menu.
(Interviewer) In your training do you ever talk about
what qualifies as an incident?
(GIM Nurse Leader 5) I don’t, no…[they] probably
made an assumption that the [new nurses] would
know what an incident is.
Overall, GIM was invited to a meeting by the corpor-
ate project team to customize their form, and the cor-
porate and local training of users focussed on the
mechanics of entering a report.
In contrast, OBS had their previous experience with
their locally owned IRS, and was proactive in contacting
the corporate project to ensure their known, specific
needs were taken into account before the software came
to their department.
So when the hospital started talking about a
[corporate IRS] system I offered to us to pilot it
because we had [the OBS IRS] and we wanted to
influence what the new system was gonna look like
and see what it could do for us. And originally the
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hospital wasn’t going to customize it. “It’s standard for
everybody and it should fit” and we said “we can’t, it’s
got to be tweaked in some areas. A lot of it can be
standard but some of it needs to be tweaked”. (OBS/
NEO Nurse Leader 1)
So we spoke with [the IRS] team in terms of putting
into [the IRS] things that would usually be associated
with adverse events in obstetrical cases. So these…
we’ve classified them into system indicators or
communication indicators or physician specific
indicators and our broader classification would be a
maternal or a fetal indicator. (OBS/NEO Physician 1)
Guided by the previous IRS OBS specific system, this
local ownership continued in the way the present IRS
was designed for OBS use.
Training also differed in OBS. Front line staff instruc-
tion focussed on more than only how to log a report.
We’re (1) trying to prevent something from
happening again like a near miss or (2) helping to deal
with certain situations better or how could we
improve…how can we fix this in the future? And
that’s the main thing that stood out when doing the
training. (OBS/NEO Bedside Nurse 4)
This nurse began after the official roll out, and was
trained on the unit.
When I came in my Educator [went] over what is an
[incident] and what we should be completing [a
report] for. (OBS/NEO Bedside Nurse 6)
While the detail of the reporting method is important,
these interviewees did not mention that aspect, but did men-
tion the reason to report. Obviously the mechanics of how
to enter a report must be learned at some point, but the
training in OBS focussed as well on the reasons to report.
The introduction of the IRS differed in GIM and OBS.
The customization of the IRS for these two depart-
ments happened differently. In GIM, the process was initi-
ated by the corporate project team in a top-down
approach, and the customization of the IRS form came
about through experience in a pilot project. The OBS div-
ision approached the corporate project with their pre-
determined customization needs in a bottom-up fashion.
The training also differed between the departments, with
GIM focussing on the logistics of filling a report, and OBS
going beyond this to cover the rationale for reporting.
Influence of interprofessional training
Various individuals in GIM were patient safety leaders,
and individual practitioners had gone to conferences,
and trainees (e.g. residents, nurses) were being increas-
ingly exposed to patient safety in their residency and
training, but there had not been a coordinated, systemic
effort to educate GIM practitioners about IRSs. When
looking at Neonate care separately from Obstetrics, this
department shared the non-specific patient safety train-
ing experience with GIM –there seemed not to have
been a deliberate effort to train the division. However,
the issue was different in OBS.
Due to the threat of costly litigation, the Society of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada played a key
role in training labour and delivery professionals in pa-
tient safety, and this organization developed a course in
2002 called Managing Obstetrical Risk Effectively, or
MORE OB, based on knowledge and procedures in the
aviation industry. (MORE OB is now owned by Salus, a
private company.)
So the brilliant thing with MORE OB is its standard
obstetrical content that any care provider, nurse or
physician can review and access; it’s a pre-test and
post-test for knowledge… They picked all the high
error and litigation issues that are common in
Obstetrics; shoulder dystocia, post-partum haemorrhage,
to give you examples and they created tools. (OBS/NEO
Nurse Leader 1)
But the content of MORE OB was not the only
“brilliant” piece. There was a major portion on inter-
professional collaboration. It provided “safe spaces” for
differing opinions:
And everybody has a right to ask a question and it is
encouraged and fostered and learning beside each
other. We shared each other’s viewpoints on how we
cared and how we saw a case. And that was really
good because both team members be it medicine or
nursing commented about how good it was to have
that sharing going on (OBS/NEO Nurse Leader 7)
MORE OB introduced multidisciplinary simulations to
the obstetrical teams, which formed the basis of present-day
simulations. It also had a substantial component on tackling
the hospital hierarchy; during the didactic training sessions,
nurses and physicians had the opportunity to teach each
other, and everyone got the same message at the same time:
That was a wonderful program. It was phenomenal in
the teaching aspect of it, it was great in the
interdisciplinary aspect of it as getting us to all work
together as a team. It was great to show the
obstetricians our role in it all, and for us to see the
obstetricians’ role. So I loved it. (OBS/NEO Bedside
Nurse 1)
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MORE OB also provided the participants with specific
communication tools to help flatten the hierarchy in
daily work, as expressed by physicians and nurses.
We’ve also empowered the nursing colleagues as well as
the whole allied healthcare colleagues to go directly to
the most responsible staff [physician] or designate…In
the past regimented nursing model, they would just
communicate within themselves and then one person
would communicate. (OBS/NEO Physician 5)
We’re supposed to contact the junior resident first
and then the senior resident and then the staff. If it’s a
big emergency, I don’t even bother with the junior
resident … I go straight for the senior and if I don’t
like the way they’re treating the case, well I go to staff.
(OBS/NEO Bedside Nurse 5)
The MORE OB training helped establish a culture of
patient safety, as a physician stated,
“I think with a change in culture with the MORE OB
we became a bit more proactive” (OBS/NEO Physician 2).
This was echoed by a midwife.
Blameless, everybody has a voice, everybody has a job
to report, and everybody has a role in this discussion.
It’s in camera, it doesn’t go out the door other than
positive things as to what we could change. It’s not
finding blame it’s everybody critically analysing
something objectively in a collegial manner with the
patient’s safety as the driving force. (OBS/NEO
Midwife 2)
As mentioned, the programme was limited to labour
and delivery – neonatology was not a participating div-
ision in the training. However, some of the tools of
MORE OB were part of the neonatology department
too: “[The neonatologists] have told us several times, if
you have an issue with a physician on nights give them a
call 24/7” (OBS/NEO Respiratory Therapist 3).
Interprofessional training and culture were a substan-
tial influence on reporting practices in OBS/NEO.
Table 3 summarizes the main influences on how the
IRS was used in the two divisions.
A model of the use of the IRS and its corresponding
influences is depicted in Fig. 2.
Discussion
This study focussed on the differences in incident
reporting, by examining incident detection, analysis, out-
comes and feedback in two divisions: GIM and OBS/
NEO. It also analyzed the factors that help to account
for the differences in the two divisions. The importance
of studying interventions to understand the underlying
factors that enable success is growing in importance in
patient safety generally [45–47]. This comparative study
was undertaken in one hospital; hence the higher
organizational level influences were common. Nonethe-
less, there were major differences in the approaches in
the two divisions.
The incident reporting system
In terms of detecting, the main reporters in GIM were
nurses, and the main items reported were falls and
medication errors. As discussed, these are outcome
driven reports – the fall or the medication error hap-
pened, and that is the reason the report is entered into
the IRS. In OBS, the reporters were of various profes-
sions, and the reported items were largely pre-
determined on their locally-owned dropdown list, many
being near miss situations. The near miss reporting has
also been called process reporting, as the process trig-
gers the report, not the outcome. The contrast between
an outcome and process reporting system has been stud-
ied by Nuckols, Bell, Paddock, & Hilborne [48]. In
studying the content of nearly 4000 reports from an aca-
demic and community hospital, they found that
In terms of their potential usefulness to improving
patient safety, the process-oriented reports were far
better for determining incidents’ preventability and
identifying contributing system and provider factors.
Outcome-oriented reports were better for identifying
patient factors….Hospitals should specify which
undesirable outcomes, if any, should be submitted to
their voluntary incident reporting systems and should
train staff to focus on reporting problems with care and
describing those problems in detail ([48], pp. 143, 144).
Table 3 Comparison of the influences on the IRS process in GIM and OBS/NEO
Influence on IRS use GIM OBS/NEO
Threat of litigation Moderate; had an inhibiting effect on, especially,
physician reporting
Very high; had encouraged the domain to be proactive, and
embrace IRS use
Introduction of IRS Top down, customization asked of GIM Bottom up, customization asked by OBS
Instrumentally focussed training – how to report Training focused on reasons to report
Interprofessional training Minimal interprofessional training MORE OB (in OBS division), which gave rise to several safety
practices including the OBS specific predecessor of the current IRS
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When seen on this scale, GIM’s reporting is most simi-
lar to the outcome oriented reports and OBS/NEO is
most similar to the process oriented reports, whereby
Nuckols et al. clearly state that the process oriented re-
ports have a greater potential to improve patient safety.
In GIM, nurse and physician analysis was undertaken in-
dependently – a siloed approach, similar to a previous study
[22] described earlier. In Obstetrics, only the first stage of
analysis was undertaken independently by a nurse leader,
and all subsequent stages (pre-screen and QA committee)
were undertaken interprofessionally. OBS/NEO had main-
tained a collegial environment, focussed on change and
learning, similar to a process described earlier in a respira-
tory therapy setting [32] and an accident and emergency
department [21]. Unlike the GIM model of individual ana-
lysis, the Obstetrics model of layers of interdisciplinary re-
view allowed multiple voices to be heard, culminating in a
department level QA interprofessional review.
Feedback in IRSs is a common problem generally, not
only in healthcare [49, 50], and it acts as one of the
more significant barriers to reporting in healthcare
[23, 25]. However, OBS/NEO’s newsletter, an analysis
process inclusive of the reporter (if the reporter chose to
participate in the QA meeting), and most especially inter-
ventions linked to IRS reports have made progress on en-
suring reporter’s voices were listened to. In GIM there had
not been much progress to ensure the reporter’s experi-
ence was valued. Benn et al. [51] studied feedback in
healthcare IRSs, and found a multitude of ways it was
practiced. However, “Getting the content of feedback right
in terms of the message it conveys regarding how incident
data will be used, the level of anonymity provided to re-
porters and the potential consequences of disclosing er-
rors and near misses through reporting are all critical
issues that can impact upon reporting culture” ([51], p.
20). It is recommended that both GIM and OBS/NEO
could improve their feedback processes, in order to ensure
a more effective IRS.
The examples on learning from IRS reporting were
also different between the divisions. In GIM, nurses
Fig. 2 A descriptive model of the incident reporting processes in GIM and OBS/NEO, including influencing factors
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often received the individual feedback on their perform-
ance through “teachable moments”, which may have led
to individualized learning. Specific improvements based
on the IRS data were not mentioned by interviewees in
GIM; in fact, the assumption was often that the system
was for data collection and/or that reports were ending
up in a figurative black hole. However, physician M&M
rounds may have used the IRS to populate the cases dis-
cussed, but the link between M&M rounds and the IRS
was tenuous.
In contrast, OBS/NEO had many examples of learning
that resulted directly from the IRS. For example, the ac-
cidental extubation project that the respiratory therapist
spearheaded in OBS/NEO began with a recommenda-
tion to track the accidental extubations through the IRS.
With a focus on reporting, and the commonality of the
problem at other respected NICUs, the IRS became a
more reliable way of knowing there was a problem, and
that the intervention was successful. This hospital’s acci-
dental extubation problem was known through analysis
of incident reports, providing a clear linkage from the
incident reports to a seemingly successful intervention.
The influences
Litigation influenced incident reporting in both divi-
sions, but in different ways. The GIM influence is the
one traditionally reported in the literature: reluctance to
report for fear of being sued or losing one’s licence [52,
53], although this is a bigger issue for physicians than
for nurses [13]. However, as our data showed, litigation
had the opposite effect in OBS/NEO. The threat of liti-
gation is exceedingly high in these fields, and this serves
as great motivation to avoid a lawsuit, and reporting
practices are well established [19, 54]. However, this did
not come about without some dedicated effort, specific-
ally in training.
The introduction of the IRS in the two divisions, in
terms of both customization and training on the IRS,
may have been influenced by local ownership and the
type of interaction with the front line practitioners. OBS
had customized their form based on their previous ex-
perience – they knew what they wanted, and were able
to approach the corporate project with their needs. Fur-
thermore, they trained their users on “why” to report, in-
stead of restricting the training to how to enter an event.
This type of local ownership was termed “co-optation”
by Waring & Currie [19], where the receiving group of a
corporate project had the skills necessary to customize
the corporate project to suit the needs of the local group
and the larger organization. In GIM, with comparatively
little local ownership of the system, the IRS was
regarded more of a corporate project in which the
customization of the IRS was invited by the corporate
team, the training was corporately given and the training
focussed principally on “how” to report. The importance
of local ownership has been seen in the use of checklists;
the World Health Organization endorses customizing
the surgical safety checklist for local applicability [55], as
has the Ontario Hospital Association [56]. The success
of the Central Line Associated Blood Stream Infection
(CLABSI) initiative was in part due to the customization
of the checklist [47]. Local ownership was a key factor in
the introduction of the IRS in OBS, but not in GIM.
Another key concept was the interaction with the health-
care professionals. If the corporate project allows the front
line team to experiment and implement the intervention
without being micro-managed, the front line team will be
more interested in shepherding the intervention to be suc-
cessful. As Reay et al. [57] found in their case study of insti-
tutional change, “When managers are able to encourage
professionals to try new practices, and thus engage in
quasi-independent meaning-making, the possibility of sig-
nificant and sustainable changes in the nature of work be-
comes more feasible” (p987). This was also seen in the
Michigan Keystone project, “The vertical core must focus
on enabling teams to make changes, figuring out why some
things are hard for staff, and making them easier to do”
([47], p. 195). While in this study, GIM was asked to par-
ticipate in the introduction of the IRS, their contribution
was driven by the corporate project. In contrast, OBS had a
far more active role in driving how the IRS was introduced
in their department, while still working within the wider
framework of the corporate project. The type of involve-
ment of GIM and OBS differed, which contributed to how
the IRS was subsequently used in each division.
It is difficult to overestimate the influence of the
MORE OB training, which has been shown to increase
obstetrical outcomes and decrease insurance rates [58].
It had interdisciplinary teamwork as part of its funda-
mental philosophy. Interdisciplinarity has been identified
as a major area of patient safety research where more
improvement must be made [59, 60]. Weaver et al. [61]
undertook a systematic review and found that interpro-
fessional team training and/or communication initiatives
are core elements of successful interventions to improve
safety culture. Siassakos et al. [62] studied obstetrical in-
terventions in team training, and found that early, direct
and closed loop communication was critical for success-
ful teams. Obstetrics is known for their leadership in
team training [63]. Pronovost, Holzmueller, Ennen, &
Fox [64] note that “The signs are hopeful that obstetrics
and gynecology can make significant progress; this de-
partment is leading the field in team training” (p8). Ob-
stetrics interventions also include concepts used in the
aviation industry such as crew resource management
[65] and simulation [66, 67]. Expanding the M&M meet-
ing composition is another way to assure interdisciplin-
ary collaboration. “If the team is provided a sufficiently
Hewitt et al. Archives of Public Health  (2016) 74:34 Page 15 of 19
diverse set of backgrounds, viewpoints, skills, and inter-
ests, then hidden assumptions are exposed; a broader
repertoire of options, tactics, and tools is made available;
tacit knowledge is made more explicit; and more inter-
pretations and preferences are expressed” [68].
Team training has been seen as a critical ingredient in
other patient safety initiatives. The very successful Mich-
igan Keystone project that successfully tackled the prob-
lem of central line associated bloodstream infections
included an interdisciplinary approach as one of its key
factors.
Local improvement teams in the participating units
were designed to not be dominated by any single
profession but to have representatives from all
stakeholder groups…Frequent interactions, reciprocal
communication, and decentralization increase the
social pressure to cooperate by reducing the social
distance between members of unequal status and
authority and strengthening the acceptance of group
norms by the group members ([47], p. 182,183).
The importance of team training is a key factor for pa-
tient safety and incident reporting.
A specific dimension of team training is empowerment
of those in the healthcare hierarchy who traditionally
have not had a strong voice. MORE OB addressed this
directly, ensuring that nurses, and later allied health pro-
fessionals, were able to speak up if they felt something
was going wrongly. This was another key component of
the Michigan Keystone project, but this tool is very chal-
lenging to bring to the larger healthcare community.
Reflecting on the participating hospitals in the initial
Michigan Keystone project, Pronovost wrote
Perhaps most concerning is the response from nurses
in participating hospitals when asked: “if a new nurse
in your hospital saw a senior physician placing a
catheter but not complying with the checklist, would
the nurse speak up and would the physician comply?”
The answer is almost always, “there is no way the
nurse would speak up.” Doubly disturbing, physicians
and nurses uniformly agree patients should receive
the checklist items ([69], p. 204).
Empowering nurses is a critical aspect of patient
safety, but it is far from trivial to sustain in routine
healthcare practice.
Conclusion
IRSs, while a key tool in patient safety, have been the
subject of many studies, mainly focusing on reporting
(or underreporting). This study of the whole process of
incident reporting from detection to learning provides a
more complex view. Furthermore, this study compared
the processes at two hospital divisions, and revealed
both the similarities and the differences between them.
The model provided in Fig. 2 portrays these processes
such that the two divisions can be directly compared,
and also depicts the factors underlying the differences in
the reporting processes.
Typical studies of IRSs focus on getting more events
into the system [23–25]. However, more recent studies
suggest that the number of reported events in an IRS is
not a metric by which the system should be judged [29].
Pham et al. state that IRSs can be used to address local
problems, and aggregate information for uncommon
conditions. They recommend understanding and enhan-
cing the analysis and system changing aspects to IRS,
and providing meaningful feedback to the reporters who
detect and submit reports. This study enhances under-
standing of these issues, by going beyond asking why
people report or do not report and that interrogating the
analysis and learning processes is integral to a successful
IRS. This study also demonstrated a case of an uncom-
mon condition (the accidental extubation of neonates)
whose local existence was confirmed through the use of
the IRS.
Many issues in safety are only analyzed once errors are
found, or once something has failed [70–73]. This study
was not prompted by a failure, nor was it an analysis of
a system that was dysfunctional. The study of the nor-
mal, of the unremarkable, with an aim to explain the
processes and understand the underlying dynamics is a
new approach in safety [74, 75]. Studying when “things
go right”, or safety II, is only now earning recognition in
safety circles [76–78]. “Safety II is proactive, continu-
ously trying to anticipate developments and events. It as-
sumes that things, whether they go right or wrong,
basically happen in the same way, regardless of the out-
come” ([79], p. 239). This study helps promote this new
focus in safety research by studying an IRS that seems to
be functioning well.
The well-known Michigan Keystone initiative to reduce
CLABSI (Central Line Insertion Bloodstream Infection)
infections is a good case study of looking at a successful
project to try to understand why it worked [47], and why
a subsequent replication did not [45]. In these analyses,
the authors note that the initiative is often trivially attrib-
uted to a short list of items, notably a checklist [46], which
is an unfair depiction of the complexity of relationships
and interactions that account for the programme’s success.
Our study adds to this approach, by looking at the normal
functioning of an IRS, with an aim to investigate factors
that could account for how and why the system functions
as it does in the two departments. In so doing, oversimpli-
fication of the factors was avoided, yet a concise explan-
ation of why the IRS functions as it does was given.
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This study has limitations. It took place in only one
hospital, and was primarily restricted to interviews, al-
beit a wide variety of practitioners were interviewed to
maximize the diversity of opinions on the IRS. This di-
versity exists in other healthcare environments (ICU,
radiotherapy, surgery), so the views on the IRS and its
functioning in the divisions are likely found in other
healthcare domains. There may be other successful
structures of an IRS that this study did not capture,
given its limitation to two divisions. The findings from
the divisions studied might not easily transfer to similar
divisions in other hospitals, with different contextual fac-
tors. This study may not have captured all of the factors
that influence the reporting processes in the two divi-
sions examined, although those that were not described
are likely to be less influential than the themes
presented.
Practical implications of this study can be summarized
in three broad categories. First, the importance of the in-
terprofessional training seemed to be highly significant.
Nembhard & Tucker [80] talked of healthcare tradition-
ally using autonomous learning (experientially based) as
opposed to deliberate learning (through specific training),
and found that interdisciplinary collaboration promoted
deliberate learning. This deliberate learning – interdiscip-
linary didactic sessions coupled with practice through sim-
ulations is quite costly, and serves as a non-trivial barrier
to running courses like MORE OB. However, recently,
medical insurers have paid for front line staff to participate
in simulations, anticipating that the training will result in
safer care, and thus fewer claims [81]. Medical insurers
could play a more active role in encouraging these inter-
professional learning opportunities.
A second area of practice implication is that of diver-
sity. In his analysis of the values of highly successful
healthcare organizations, Bohmer [82] highlights the im-
portance of self-study and seeking dissenting views, the
latter encouraged by Tucker & Edmondson [83] and
Pronovost [69], especially encouraging nurses to speak
up. The idea of having diverse opinions in groups re-
sponsible for patient safety is a key aspect to the success
of the CLABSI Michigan Keystone project, in their con-
ception of a Comprehensive Unit Safety Programme
(CUSP) [84]. Diversity is also encouraged in M&M
rounds [68]. The review of events by more than one
profession allows a much richer understanding and well
vetted recommendations for improvement [21, 32]. “Di-
versity of narratives can be seen as an enormous source
of resilience in complex systems …The more angles, the
more there can be to learn” ([85], p. 201). Encouraging
more than one opinion and discussing with an aim to
understand could help those involved in the IRS
process bring a more holistic understanding to re-
ported incidents.
A third area of practical implications deals with feed-
back. Leveson postulates that the main problem with
safety in modern times is the lack of control or feedback
loops allowing for those who initiate an action to learn
its effects before an ultimate outcome [85]. Feedback
has been identified as a critical IRS function [4], and the
lack of feedback is seen as a barrier to reporting, as
many IRSs fall short by not informing reporters of the
effect of their efforts [23, 25, 51, 86]. This study adds to
the literature in emphasizing the importance of feedback
in IRSs, and suggests the importance of ensuring that
feedback to the reporter is made an integral function of
the IRS.
Finally, IRSs continue to be seen as important tools to
improve patient safety. Yet, as has been shown, these
systems can fall short of achieving the intended objec-
tives. It is hoped that the findings from this study will be
useful to academics and practitioners as they enrich
their understanding of IRSs to enhance patient safety.
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